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Abstract
When individuals seek one another out to combine their resources and produce collective
benefits not available by acting alone, they form a self-organized group.   Drawing on club theory from
economics, theories of motivation and social integration from psychology, and theories of coalition
formation and bargaining from political science and psychology, we presume that multiple such groups
can form from a pool of potential members, and that members have control over their membership
choices subject to the constraints posed by others’ preferences and choices.  We presume that the
benefits produced by a group will depend on the composition of members, and that members may differ
both in the resources they bring to the group and the benefits they hope to obtain.  Based on these
presumptions, the relevant elements of self-organized group formation are identified as follows: At the
individual level, resources and preferences or needs are relevant.  At the interpersonal level, individuals
gather information about the resources and preferences of others and negotiate whether or not to form
or join groups.  At the group level, some production function turns resources into group goods.  The
composition of member resources will affect what the group produces, and the composition of member
preferences and relative member power will affect how goods are divided. Member satisfaction with
outcomes and the perceived costs and benefits of attempting to join or form an alternative group should
affect the stability of membership in newly formed groups. 
The social poker paradigm translates these elements into a card game that allows for the
manipulation of individual resources, interpersonal information, relative power among members, the
minimize effective size of groups, and other variables of potential interest.  Individual resources are
represented by playing cards, which individuals can combine by forming a group and pooling their cards
to form card hands that earn the group money.
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Social Poker: A Paradigm for Studying the Formation of Self-Organized Groups
In this paper we (1)  present a theoretical
framework for analyzing the formation of self-
organized groups, and (2) introduce a laboratory
paradigm for studying the processes involved in
the formation of groups within a controlled
setting.   The paradigm uses a social card game
to create conditions under which players may
form ephemeral acting coalitions or more stable
standing groups.
Our focus in on groups formed by people
who will become the group’s members, and who
expect to gain some individual benefit from their
membership in the group. Examples are
academic collaborations, youth gangs, revolving
credit organizations, neighborhood watch
associations, and new businesses.  Our model
does not apply to groups formed primarily to
serve the purposes of some wider organization,
which is typical of work groups, or to groups
formed in a “top down” fashion by non-
members who assign others to the group, as is
typical in the military, for example.  In self-
organized groups, members themselves make
decisions about who will be a member.
 We presume that self-organized groups
form out of some larger pool of potential
members, and that these potential members have
access to resources that they could contribute to
collaborative ventures.  These include both
tangible resources and intangible resources such
as knowledge and skills. We presume that
potential members are motivated to form or join
groups by needs, desires, and expectations
about what the group might provide, and that
they are free to choose whether or not to join
forces with one another.  We also presume that
different configurations of individuals will form
groups that are relatively more or less
productive and satisfying to their members,
based on what members contribute, what they
receive, and what they value.  We presume that
the “optimal” set of groups, which would be
maximally productive and satisfying for a given
population of people, will not necessarily form. 
We also presume that in some cases, multiple
potential groupings will provide equivalent levels
of productivity and satisfaction. 
We are interested in (1) the temporary
coalitions that form out of a pool of individuals;
(2) whether these coalitions stabilize into
standing groups, and, if so, how stable these
groups are over time; (3) how the distribution of
group resources among members interacts with
membership choices and group stability; and (4)
what factors lead to the formation of more or
less “optimal” sets of groups.   The distinction
between standing and acting groups (Arrow &
McGrath, 1993) is that acting groups only exist
as long as members are actively interacting;
standing groups (examples are a family, a work
group, a basketball club) continue to exist as
entitites in the minds of group members even
when members are not assembled.
In the first section of the paper, we
discuss ideas from several theoretical traditions:
the theory of clubs from economics, motivation
and social integration perspectives from social
psychology, and coalition and bargaining theory
as developed in several disciplines. 
1. Theoretical Perspectives
1.1. Club theory  
Club theory (Buchanan, 1965) addresses
the production of local public goods by
decentralized market processes. The general
economic problem of public goods is as follows:
When goods are jointly produced and non-
divisible in consumption (i.e., one person’s
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consumption does not deplete the capacity of
others to consume it), then theories of rationality,
egoistic preferences, and decentralized decision-
making predict that these goods will be, at best,
under-provided or, at worst, not provided at
all—despite a general preference that such
goods should be provided (Buchanan, 1968;
Olson, 1965; Samuelson 1954, 1955).  
If goods are produced even if everyone
does not contribute, and contributions are costly,
then rational individuals will not contribute.  If
sufficient numbers of people do nevertheless
contribute, than non-contributing “free-riders”
will enjoy access to the good produced by
others’ payments.  Anticipating that others will
not contribute, people may also anticipate that a
contribution from themselves would be wasted,
being insufficient to produce the good by itself.
Thus rational individuals will not act as necessary
to provide public goods that all desire. 1
Buchanan recognized that a subset of
individuals within a wider population could
produce goods for their particular subset
within the same assumptions of rationality,
egoistic preferences and decentralized decision-
making, while solving the free-rider problem. 
This could happen if individuals were free to sort
themselves into “clubs,” limiting membership
only to an optimal number of contributing
individuals.   Access to club goods would be
restricted to members only.  Thus clubs provide
a kind of good that is intermediate between
public goods and purely private goods. 
Club theory predicts that when individuals
are free to sort themselves into appropriate
clubs, a socially optimal set of clubs will emerge
from the decentralized decision-making of
rational, egotistic individuals. These optimal
clubs should include others according to their
capacity and willingness to pay, and exclude
others when crowding effects undermine the
value returned from membership.  Individuals
are presumed to join or abandon clubs based on
calculating the value derived from membership
relative to the costs. In an important aside,
Buchanan notes that the theory applies: “only to
the extent that the motivation for joining in
sharing arrangements is itself economic; that is,
only if choices are made on the basis of costs
and benefits of particular goods and services as
these are confronted by the individual.  In so far
as individuals join clubs for camaraderie, as
such, the theory does not apply” (1968, p. 
548).
 For consideration of a broader range of
motives than the economic one addressed by
Buchanan, we turn next to social psychological
theories.
1.2. Psychological needs  
Schutz’s (1958) model of group behavior
incorporates three basic psychological needs
that groups satisfy: inclusion, control, and
affection.2  Inclusion corresponds to the need
for affiliation with others who provide social
approval and validation.  Control corresponds
both to the need for power and dependency
needs — the desire to exert influence over
others as a way to control the environment, and
the desire to rely on the influence and guidance
of others.  Affection corresponds to a need for
intimacy and close relationships (which
Buchanan refers to as “comraderie”), and
includes the need to both express and receive
affection. 
 Schutz proposed that the importance of
these needs varies depending on a group’s stage
of development, with inclusion dominating in the
first stage, control in the second, and affection in
the third.  In the final stage, ties of affection,
mutual influence, and affection are dissolved. 
We add a fourth need not addressed by Schutz:
the need for achievement (McClelland, 1985),
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which is served when groups are able to reach
valued goals that cannot be attained by an
individual acting alone.  These four needs can be
added to the basic economic need (or desire)
for goods and services presumed by club theory
as a fundamental motivation. 
Drawing both on club theory and on this
broader analysis of member motivation, Arrow,
McGrath, and Berdahl (in press) propose that
clubs, which they define as groups oriented
primarily toward the satisfaction of member
needs, can be distinguished according to their
relative emphasis on addressing different types
of needs.  Economic clubs are those envisioned
by standard club theory — collectives formed to
provide concrete resources that members
desire.  Social clubs are those whose main
attraction for members is the “camaraderie” and
social support provided.  In these groups, the
primary source of reward is affiliation with the
group and interaction with other members.
Activity clubs are groups that are attractive to
members because they allow them to engage in
enjoyable activities--often ones that require
more than one person, like playing bridge or
softball--or to complete valued tasks. 
Opportunities to influence others and be
influenced in turn (control) are provided by
group interaction in a variety of clubs and work
groups.
1.3. Social integration 
Moreland (1987) identified four forces
that lead to the social integration of people into
groups.  Environmental integration is the
tendency of people who live in the same physical
or social environment to form groups; it
emphasizes the importance of proximity in
determining, out of a large pool of individuals,
who will become connected to whom.  Affective
integration refers to emotional forces such as
interpersonal attraction.  The proliferation of
dyads formed on the basis of mutual attraction
can lead to the formation of larger groups
through the chaining together of overlapping
dyads.  Cognitive integration occurs as people
develop shared methods of communication and
shared interpretations of reality.   According to
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954),
people seek out others to help them make sense
of the world, and are attracted to those who
validate their own existing beliefs.  Perceived
similarity among individuals is thus a basis for
cognitive integration.  Behavioral integration
occurs as people coordinate their actions so as
to satisfy one another’s needs.  Common fate, or
outcome interdependence, can promote
behavioral integration when collective action can
affect shared outcomes.
  While club theory provides a model by
which decentralized decision-making can lead to
theoretically optimal group formation, and basic
social psychological theories provide insight into
a broader range of motives and factors that
affect who will join with whom in what types of
groups, the coalition formation literature
addresses the problems of unequal resources
and reward allocation, and considers how these
factors affect the choice of group partners. 
1.4. Coalition formation and bargaining
theory
The two main issues addressed by the
literature on coalition formation are which
coalitions will form, and how members of
coalitions will divide up their rewards.  In a
typical experiment, players have differing
resources, and some minimum number of
resources are necessary to form a coalition and
receive a payoff.   Only one coalition can form
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from the pool of players.   Experimental results
to date provide support for Komorita and
Chertkoff’s (1973) bargaining theory and
Komorita’s (1979) equal excess model.  The
former predicts that weak members will
emphasize the equality norm, strong members
will emphasize the equity norm, and the actual
distribution will at first be midway between what
these two norms predict, but over time will be
adjusted to reflect the maximum that a member
could receive in alternative coalitions. The latter
predicts that players will initially expect equal
splits but will use the values of alternative
coalitions in bargaining for a larger share, with
the actual distribution reflecting the value of each
player’s best alternative followed by an equal
division of any resources left over after meeting
these values.  Both models suggest that actual
outcomes are a compromise between conflicting
distribution principles: (1) equality norm, (2)
equity norm, and (3) relative power (which is
exploited in the bargaining process), and that the
distribution will change over time.
As far as which coalitions will form, the
normative prediction for “simple games” (in
which only one payoff is available) is that
minimal winning coalitions will form: that is, the
smallest effective group will form, since the
payoff is the same regardless of which group
forms.  In a smaller group, members will expect
a larger overall reward than they would in a
larger group. Both experimental studies and
political research suggests than actual coalitions
commonly exceed this minimum, however
(Komorita & Kravitz, 1983; van de Kragt,
Orbell, & Dawes, 1983).
2. Elements of a Model
 
2.1. Presumptions
Drawing on the theoretical traditions just
reviewed, we have constructed a theoretical
framework for studying self-organized group
formation based on the following presumptions:
Membership choices:
(1) Multiple groups (clubs) can form out of a
pool of potential members.  Thus all or most
individuals will have the potential to be included
in a variety of different possible groups. 
(2) Members can freely choose what groups
they want to form or join, and they may also
leave a group at any time.
Social exchange:
(3) Potential members have resources that they
can contribute toward the production of club
goods.  Different individuals may have different
resources.   
(4) Individuals form (or join) groups to receive
something of value that they either cannot obtain
alone or that can be obtained more cost
effectively through collective action.  Valued
benefits can include both economic and
psychological rewards. 
(5) Expected rewards may vary across
individuals and across groups for the same
individual.
Collective goods:
(6) The goods produced by a group will differ
depending on the composition of members, the
resources they contribute, and the production
function.  Some goods will be indivisible, and
some divisible.   
(7) Members will allocate divisible goods
amongst themselves based on some combination
of norms and bargaining power.  Because
members are free to leave, the rewards
anticipated in alternative groups and the threat of
defection can be used in bargaining for rewards.
Member-group relations:
(8) Individuals will base their decisions about
membership and their demands for rewards on
their information about the resources,
expectations, and power of themselves and
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other potential members, and on expectations of
relative rewards in different groups derived from
this information.3
2.2.  Building blocks
From these presumptions, we propose the
following core elements as basic building blocks
for group formation:
Individual level:
C Individuals (potential members)
C Resources attached to individuals
C Motives: Individual needs, desires,
intentions, and expectations
Interpersonal level:
C Knowledge about other individuals and
their resources, needs, and expectations
C A way for individuals to communicate
information and negotiate with one
another
Group level:
Each potential grouping of individuals has a
composition of relevant individual elements
C Composition of resources
C Composition of preferences (needs,
intentions, goals)
Once groups have formed, the following group-
level processes are needed:
C A production function that turns combined
resources into group goods. 
Goods produced and enjoyed by members can
be both divisible and non-divisible.   If there are
any divisible goods, the group will also need:
C A collective decision process that
determines how divisible group goods will
be divided
The production function and the decision
process  together yield at set of outcomes, at the
individual, group, and societal level.  One can
consider what the group collectively is able to
produce, what the set of groups in the society
produce, and the outcomes each individual
group member receives.
Some groups disband as soon as the
members have assembled, completed their
interaction, and received the immediate benefits
of that interaction. Standing groups that continue
their existence will also need to develop:
C A collective decision process to regulate
membership, including the admission or
rejection of prospective new members.
In the next section of the paper, we elaborate on
these building blocks.  Then we introduce the
social poker paradigm, and explain how the
elements are modeled in this paradigm.
2.3. Individual-level elements
Individual  resources.  Individuals have
control over resources that they might put to
varying private uses but that also can be
combined with the resources of others to
produce group goods (which corresponds to
local public goods).  Where private goods are
concerned, a diversity of resources is necessary
for productive exchange.  Individuals who hold
diverse goods and whose values differ with
respect to those goods can often increase their
private welfare by “trucking and bartering.”  
With group goods all individuals’ having
the same resources would not necessarily
preclude successful production.  Sets of
individuals can pool their resources to reach
some critical amount;  simple aggregation, for
example, might produce enough lumber and
labor to build a barn, for example. Other group
products require individuals with
diverse resources.  Building a modern brick
house, for example, requires  diverse skills—in
design, bricklaying, electrical wiring, plumbing,
carpentry, etc. A similar diversity of skills is
often present in academic collaborations with
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scholars bringing different technical skills,
literature backgrounds, writing skills and other
capacities to their joint effort.
Individual preferences for goods. 
According to club theory, the production of club
goods requires some homogeneity of
preferences among those who join together to
produce them.  However, homogeneity is not
required within the wider population from which
such groups emerge. Subsets of this wider
population might quite satisfactorily produce a
mosaic of diverse clubs with different club
goods.
If we broaden the scope to include
psychological “goods” that satisfy needs for
inclusion, control, and affection, then
complementary needs may be just as important. 
People who want to control others are better
matched with others who seek guidance and
direction, rather than with others who have a
high need for power, like themselves.
2.4. Interpersonal-level elements  
Interpersonal knowledge.  When
resources and preferences differ across
individuals, people need information about the
resources others have and whether others are
interested in using these resources for collective
projects. Because such information should help
people find partners for successful
collaborations, people should be motivated to
acquire it.  
Interpersonal communication. 
Knowledge about others’ resources and others’
goals for employing those resources can be
acquired directly from potential collaborators or
indirectly from others who know potential
collaborators.  It can also sometimes be
extracted from a public data base or inferred
from other publicly available information about a
person.  A new faculty member, for example,
may be inferred to have fresh ideas and lots of
energy; a senior faculty member with a history of
successful grant writing and collaborative
research (which can be determined by reading a
web page) may be inferred to have grant writing
expertise and an interest in pooling research
ideas with others.  People interested in
collaborations may also advertise their resources
and interests publicly. 
Social networks, proximity, experience
and other criteria influence the ease of accessing
information and the cost of acquiring it.  The
problem of finding individuals interested in
pooling resources with one’s own can be a
stronger constraint on developing a successful
group effort than the problem of finding people
with complementary resources. Not everyone
who holds such resources will reciprocate one’s
interest in a joint endeavor.4
2.5. Group composition elements
Composition of resources.  What a
group can potentially produce as a group good
will depend in part on the resources that
members of that group would contribute.  We
expect people to form expectations about how
they might benefit from various possible
collaborations, given what they know about the
composition of resources of different plausible
subsets of group members.   In a field of
opportunities for group membership (and
assuming, for simplicity, that individuals can only
belong to a single group), the resources that the
individual controls might be more or less
attractive to others in their efforts to construct
groups
Complementarity or conflict among
member goals.  People with complementary
resources might or might not have
complementary goals for what they hope to
achieve from forming a group, pooling
resources,  and producing some kind of group
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good.5  When goals are complementary, people
can pursue these goals via joint action.  We
presume that individuals will join together only
when they expect this will yield some benefit
beyond  the returns they would enjoy from
private use of  their resources.
.   
2.6. Group process elements
A production function. There must be
some process by which resources are used to
produce group goods once individuals have
formed a group.  Some goods may be generated
automatically as soon as the group forms; some
will require joint action. Consider the example of
three members of Congress who discover that
they feel the same way about a controversial
issue and form a group to write legislation.  As
soon as they get together, they have increased
their political power in the larger environment
because they are no longer isolated. 
Coordinated action is still needed, however, to
produce the proposed bill.  Goods that are
produced may be non-divisible (automati-cally
available to all members) or divisible.
A collective decision process for
allocating divisible goods to members.
Individuals' bargaining power will differ
depending on the alternative nascent groups to
which their resources might be taken, and the
relative value of the resources they hold. 
Consequently, individuals will often be in a
position to bargain with others about whether
they bring their resources to one nascent group
rather than to another.  Their bargaining power
is a function of the value that other individuals
place on the resources they hold, the existence
of alternative uses for those resources, and the
skill with which they exploit their position in this
respect.6  Once the group has been formed and
the goods produced, the manner in which
bargaining power can be deployed varies
between:
1. Goods that are not divisible. By
definition, all individuals share these
benefits equally. Individuals are still in a
position to threaten to “take my resources
elsewhere,” but they cannot bargain for a
relatively greater share of nondivisible
goods.
2. Divisible goods.  Here the individual with
bargaining power is in a position to use
that power in an effort to get a
disproportionate share of the group
product.
As a practical matter, of course, most natural
groups are likely to provide some of both types
of goods. Status within a group, for example, is
a divisible good, but the status of belonging to a
particular group (seen from the outside) is not
divisible.   
Groups may develop a range of allocation
procedures.  They may depend on consensus
decision-making, on the decisions of a group
leader, or on a majority voting process.   Groups
may also rely on an “honor” system of members
simply taking what they need from the group. 
Such a system depends on trusting members not
to exploit the group by overusing or depleting
the group goods. 
3. A Laboratory Paradigm for Group
Formation: Social Poker
Formal or mathematical modeling,
computational modeling, and empirical data
(experimental and observational) all can be used
to address the problem of “bottom up”
formation of groups.  The social poker
laboratory paradigm embodies many (but not
all) of the above elements of a satisfactory
model.7  It is designed to collect data on the
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process of self-organization into groups in a
controlled setting, in which individual resources,
interpersonal information, minimum effective
group size, and other variables of interest can be
systematically manipulated.
The name social poker comes from
parallels with the well known card game.  In the
latter, players are randomly allocated resources
(the cards they are dealt) and they try to use
their resources to form a card “hand” that is
superior to the hands formed by competitors. 
The outcome is a product of luck (the “draw”)
and of the skill with which players use the cards
that they are dealt.  In social poker, participants
also receive and try to use those resources to
their best advantage.  As in the standard game,
the outcome depends on the distribution of cards
and on people’s skill in making good use of
those resources.  Distinct from the standard
game, however, in social poker no one has
enough cards to form a hand by themselves. 
Instead, they must join forces with others and
combine their cards to form a hand.  Hence the
social element: While in the standard game each
player is locked in zero sum competition with
each other player, in social poker subjects
cannot form a hand unless they form a group and
pools their resources.
Next, we show how the building blocks of
group formation described in the model are
represented in social poker.
3.1. Individual-level elements
A pool of individuals. The experimenter
determines how many individuals will constitute
the population from which groups can form.   
Individual resources.  In social poker,
“resources” are cards that are dealt by the
experimenter to each of the participants in the
experiment.  Rules of the game specify the ways
in which these “resources” might be combined,
and the value of different possible combinations. 
For example, all the standard poker hands could
be deemed valid, and earn specific monetary
payoffs. Alternatively, only particular hands
(straights and full houses, for example) may be
designated as hands that earn payoffs.  
The experimenter determines the  pattern
of cards that are dealt to players.  Cards, valid
hands, and payoffs can be set up so that all
players have equally valuable resources; the
game can also be set up so that some players
have an advantage.  The distribution of cards
will determine how profitable different possible
groups will be, and whether a given set of
people can form a hand or not.  Once dealt,
cards are under the private control of the
players. In economic terms, they are “private
goods.”  The problem is to find the most
valuable use for the resources that they have
been dealt.  
Critically, these cards acquire value only
when they are combined with cards controlled
by others, and players are not allowed to trade
or sell cards.  In the natural world, of course,
there is a market for private goods, and those
who control them are free to trade with others. 
However, some private resources -- specialized
knowledge or skill, for example, is not so easily
transferred from one person to another.  Our
interest is in the processes by which individuals
come together in group enterprises,  and in
social poker as presently developed the only
way a subject can gain financially from the cards
he or she has been dealt is by pooling them for 
a joint enterprise.8
Individual goals and preferences. In
social poker, individuals should all seek to pool
their resources with others to produce joint
goods.  We presume that they will put a higher
value on using their resources in a way that
generates higher payoffs for a group.  Beyond
the economic value of their resources, we
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presume that individuals will also vary in their
needs for affiliation (how important it is for them
to be included in a group).  This is not a variable
that is manipulated in the game, however, and
the game is constructed so that all members
have a motive to form groups, as a means to
gain access to goods.
3.2. Interpersonal-level elements
Interpersonal information.  In social
poker, full information about resources exists
when everyone knows the cards that everyone
else has been dealt.  Coupled with knowledge
about the value of different hands, people should
be able to  recognize the value of different
groupings of players based on the card
distribution.  They may also infer the preferences
of others based on this knowledge.  When
multiple possible groups will yield the same
payoff, however, players will not have a clear
economic basis for preferring one combination
of people over another, and should also find it
difficult to infer the preferences of others.
Information about the cards of others can
also be restricted, so that players have
information only about their own cards, and
need to communicate with other players to
gather information about their cards.
Interpersonal communication. In
contrast to regular poker, in social poker players
should be motivated to share information about
their cards, if that information has not been made
public at the beginning of the game. Unlike in
regular poker, however, there is little reason to
lie about one’s own cards; since forming a group
based on a lie about cards will not form a valid
hand. Instead,  there is considerable reason for
subjects to advertise their cards truthfully, even
if those cards are not particularly valuable.  This
is because the main problem in a social poker
game is to discover the optimal use for one’s
own cards, a problem that is best solved by full
and free disclosure.9
Interpersonal communication in social
poker can be handled by natural conversation
among players, via a note passing system, in
which players disclose information about cards
or suggest forming groups with others, or via a
computer-mediated version of the game that
allows players to talk via a “chat” interface.10 
Players can learn about who has what cards (in
games without full information), and find out
what groups other players want to form either
directly from the players or indirectly, by hearing
this information from a third party.
3.3. Group-level elements
Composition of resource and
preferences.  Players’ preferences for group
products are “induced” (Smith 1979) by the
experimenter’s specification of valid hands and
the payoff for those hands.  If some hands earn
more money than others, then players will have a
financial interest in becoming members of groups
with more lucrative hands.   
However, this does not ensure that the
most lucrative set of groups will form, given a
particular population of players and distribution
of cards. The distribution of cards can be
organized so that certain players have
incompatible goals. If, for example, subject A
holds a card that is a critical resource for
subjects B and C in their effort to form the most
rewarding hand (say a royal flush) and is also a
critical resource for subjects D and E in their
effort to form a somewhat less rewarding hand
(say a full house), then a clear conflict exists
between the goals of B & C and D & E—a
conflict that revolves around the choice of the
pivotal individual A. 
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The production function. In the social
poker paradigm, the experimenter specifies both
the range of group goods that might be
produced and the aggregate value that each of
those goods will generate for the group.  The
value that attaches to any card hand a group
might produce is specified by the experimenter. 
In our games, we use monetary rewards. 
Following the conventions of  regular poker, a
straight may earn less  than a full house, which
earns less than a  flush.  The critical point is that
any set of individuals who put together a
particular hand can expect a group return of
some specified value. In the term used by
experimental economists, the experimenter has
“induced preferences” (Smith 1979) among
subjects for hands that are differently
constructed in this manner.11
In the standard game of poker, players
contribute money to a “pot” which then goes in
toto to the winner, but in social poker (at least
as presently developed) the experi-menter
provides the payoff for different hands, and
multiple groups can form and receive payoffs. 
Thus, the participants in a social poker
experiment do not have purely competitive
interests, unlike the situation in   the standard
game of poker.  Instead, players have a
common interest in forming a valuable hand.   In
social poker, the experimenter (more accurately,
the funding agency) is the ultimate source of
whatever wealth that subjects take home, not
other players. 
Collective decision processes.  While
the experimenter specifies the payoff going to a
successful group, the returns going to each
constituent member of that group may be left for
the group itself to decide (if the group is given
the whole amount directly) or specified in the
experiment.  In one version, we require
members to fill out a group decision form that all
members must initial.  Individual members are
then paid the share specified on the form. 
 In another version that implements a
social dilemma within the group, group members
make private claims on the group earnings.  The
sum of private claims can exceed the full value of
group earnings, a situation equivalent to the
“commons dilemma” (Dawes 1975), in which
“over-grazing” tends to deplete the shared good. 
If the total claim is equal to or less than
the amount earned by the group, each member
is paid what they claimed (no degradation of the
group good).  If the total claim exceeds what the
group actually earned, then each member is paid
what they claimed, minus some penalty (50
cents for each dollar that the total exceeded the
group earnings in a current version of the
experiment).  If this results in a negative amount,
the member earns nothing (but is not required to
pay the experimenter).   
This version not only provides theoretical
continuity between the social poker and social
dilemma laboratory paradigms, but adds an
important new consideration to the problem
subjects confront when constructing groups. 
Absent the capacity to exploit the resource
provided by group action, players need only be
concerned with finding individuals whose cards,
in conjunction with their own, will form a
successful hand and with persuading those
individuals to join them in that effort.  With the
capacity for exploitation, however, players must
also consider the probability of a given
individual’s making claims against the group
product that will damage the value of that
product for others in the group. 
The structural, institutional and personal
variables influencing players’ judgments in this
respect, and the extent to which such judgments
weigh against the “value added” that an
individual brings to the group effort, comprise a
rich agenda for empirical study.  
Bargaining power. When the division of
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group earnings is decided collectively by group
members, people whose cards could be used in
more than one group may use their power to
bargain for a larger share of the earnings.  Thus
a player may have more bargaining power in a
nascent group attempting to form a relatively
less valuable hand (with the other players
offering a larger share of the earnings to a critical
member) than in a group attempting to form a
more valuable one (if they insist on a more equal
division, for example). The extent to which the
gains that are formally available—that might be
predicted by a game theoretic analysis—are
realized in practice is, of course, an empirical
issue.  
Collective decisions about membership.
When the game is played once, people make
individual decisions about who they want to form
a group with; dyads who have agreed to join
forces may jointly decide who they want to
recruit as additional member(s) (when the
minimum effective group size is three or more). 
When the game is played in a series of rounds,
the group as a whole may also make decisions
about whether to “regroup” in the following
round.  In multiple round experiments we have
already run, for example, some players form
relatively stable groups, and develop reciprocity
norms that function across rounds.
4. Extensions of the paradigm
Based on the initial response of other
researchers to our presentations of the social
poker paradigm, we are optimistic that it will
prove a flexible and useful approach to studying
group formation under controlled conditions.  
Unlike tasks that involve complex written
materials, which depend heavily on language and
thus require careful translation and back-
translation to be adapted in other cultures, we
believe the use of an easily explained card game
will make this paradigm relatively easy to adapt
to different languages and cultures.  
Researchers interested in exploring group
formation can easily manipulate parameters such
as minimal group size and the relative power of
players by changing the distributions of cards. 
Minimum group sizes of four or five, for
example, could be arranged based on giving
players fewer cards and limiting the types of
hands that earn payoffs.  
We are also extending the paradigm by
developing a computer-mediated version of
social poker, which is programmed in Java and
uses a web-based interface.   The difficulty of
collecting and analyzing naturalistic group
process data from freely interacting groups has,
we believe, impeded progress in the study of
groups (McGrath, 1997).  Although coding
videotaped interaction is an improvement over
coding interaction as it occurs, working with
interaction process data remains extremely
labor-intensive.  Many researchers also lack 
access to a laboratory space suitable for
videotaping interaction in the face-to-face
version of social poker.  When group members
interact via a chat-based system, however, the
free flow of interaction can be captured
automatically in log files, which makes process
analysis a less daunting task.  
The formation of social and work groups
in cyberspace is one of the most striking social
uses to which Internet users have adapted this
new communication medium.  As documented
by many researchers (see McGrath &
Hollingshead, 1994, for a recent review),
computer-mediated interaction differs from face-
to-face interaction in a variety of ways.  In a
series of experiments in progress, we will
compare results in the two media to define
similarities and also document limits to
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generalizing about group formation across
media. 
 Researchers interested in using the social
poker paradigm in their own work are
encouraged to visit the social poker web sites
(see title page) for more information and to
download the current release of computer-
mediated social poker.  For information about
card distributions and experimenter protocols for
different versions of the game, please contact the
first author.
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Notes
1. Exceptions exist, of course.  Notably,
Olson (1965) pointed out that groups in which
some single individual values the good
sufficiently to bear the full cost
personally—which he called “privileged”
groups—will be successful in providing such
goods, even when all other members can free
ride.  Similarly, even if not able to carry the full
cost of the good themselves, individuals who
believe (rightly or wrongly) that their own
contribution is “critical” to provision of the public
good will go ahead and contribute, as long as the
cost they pay is less than the benefit they receive
(van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983).  
2. Our summary of Schutz’s theory is
based on discussions by McCollom (1995) and
Forsyth (1990).
3. This conception of member-group
relations draws on Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959)
notion of comparing alternatives and on
Moreland and Levine’s (1982) model of group
socialization.
4. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility
of theft. We assume that all parties who control
resources must agree before those resources are
used in any way; that is what “controlling
resources” means. 
5. Note that “complementary” goals are
not necessarily identical goals.  The critical issue,
from each individual’s perspective, is whether
the goals that he or she holds can be better
advanced by joint action rather than individual
use of private resources. Individuals’ goals might
be quite different, but those individuals could see
private advantage from working in collaboration
with each other to advance those different goals. 
6. On the related distinction between
power and power resources, see Dahl (1956). 
A person’s bargaining resources must be both
useful and scarce, and that person must have
somewhere else to go—or be able to convince
people that he or she would be willing to sit out
rather than join the group under poor payoff
conditions—to be in a strong bargaining
position. While such negotiations are susceptible
to formal (and empirical) analysis, the strategic
interaction involved implies limits to the power of
such analysis to predict actual outcomes (Elster,
1989).  We are analyzing cooperation
structures—in which jointly held goals are
advanced by collective action—not coalitions, in
which the purpose is to defeat the goals of some
other individual or individuals via collective
action.  The critical issue is the commonality of
interest within the group that is getting together.
7. Humphrey (1976) coined the term
“social chess” to describe the strategic games he
saw as characteristic of social species (other
than the social insects).  Both chess and poker
are, of course, highly strategic games, and the
power of Humphrey’s metaphor was that it did
direct attention to the strategic interactions that
appear to preoccupy social animals.  In the
present context, however, poker provides the
better metaphor because of the problem it
presents players of finding an optimal use of the
resources that they are dealt—an attribute that is
absent from chess, but that is, we believe, a
frequent problem in social life when individuals
pool resources for jointly productive action.
8. Social poker differs from social
dilemma paradigms in which subjects are given a
dollar endowment at the outset of the experiment
and have the option of using all or some of that
endowment as a contribution toward a group
good.  In these experiments, any part not so
contributed remains part of the individual’s “take
home” pay.  (See, for example, Isaac, McCue,
and Plott 1985; Marwell & Ames, 1979).  We
are currently piloting a version of social poker in
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which players who are not included in groups
receive a small amount of money.  This would
model resources that retain private uses if not
contributed to a joint endeavor.
9. There might be a rational basis for
lying about what cards another individual holds. 
A third party, misinformed in this manner, might
choose to collaborate in a hand with the liar. Yet
the incentive for individuals to reveal their own
cards, even if they are not particularly strong
cards, makes such deceit risky. 
10. See the web sites noted on the title
page for more information about the current
software used for the computer-mediated game. 
11.Neither experimental economists nor
we, of course, imply that such “induced
preferences” are the only preferences that
subjects bring to their laboratory actions. 
Subjects might attach substantial value to
particular distributions of payoffs—equality or
fairness, for example.  The only implication is
that subjects attach some value to the monetary
payoffs that the experimenter is offering, thus
that those payoffs are motivating, to
some extent.  Notice, however, that use of
monetary incentives can provide an opportunity
for observing the extent to which subjects are
willing to diverge from their monetary
incentives—thus, in a sense, the dollar value that
they attach to such “other values.” 
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